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Preliminaries
Cost benefit analysis is a decision aid: in evaluating the merits of a
policy/decision, quantification complements qualitative analysis
Objective of social cost benefit analysis is to weigh up costs and benefits using
the common metric:
• Total (consumer plus producer) surplus valued at social costs/prices
• It is the efficiencies test
• Different weightings of gainers and losers may apply if incidence can be
identified and if germane, particularly in the absence of tax/social
welfare/direct provision programmes
• In competition law and regulation under the Commerce Act total surplus
is a justifiable criterion
Preliminaries
Continued…
Static  efficiency CBA is present value of total (consumer plus producer) surplus ignoring
investment, and usually risk management, processes
Dynamic efficiency CBA:  the present value of total surplus recognising investment and risk
management processes
Static is abstract and normative: dynamic seeks to be more positive and about process
CBA for decision-making is forward looking: goal is to estimate the expected net benefit
(efficiency) of a decision at the time the decision is taken.
• The past is only informative to the extent it allows future outcomes and behaviour to be
estimated
• Uncertainty is a key element: CBA should economically deal with risk and inform on risk of
potential outcomes and ramifications
Preliminaries
Continued…
CBA has a long history on public policy analysis
Commerce Commission has generally
– sought to calculate the benefits of a “factual” (e.g. regulation, or merged entity) relative to a
“counterfactual” (less regulation, or no merger)
– Used total surplus CBA in investigations of mergers and contracts
– In regulation it has sought to evaluate “control” (or more regulation) versus “no control” (status quo) in  its
inquiries, and employed a different criterion: counting transfers as a benefit.
CBA
• Requires precise  specification the factual and counterfactual: factors that are the same under both the
factual and counterfactual play a minor role in the analysis
Overview of Commerce Commission Approach to Regulation
Basic framework applied to Airports, Gas Pipelines and (potentially) Electricity Lines
Businesses
Factual: price control (in gas pipelines two, five year price paths)
Counterfactual: status quo of light-handed regulation + information disclosure
Commission’s benefits of control (relative to counterfactual):
• Reduced excess profits and dead-weight-losses
• Reduced productive inefficiency
• Reduced dynamic inefficiency
Commission’s costs of control:
• Failure to achieve benefits of control (excess profit and deadweight-loss reduction)
• Reduced productive efficiency
• Reduced dynamic efficiency
The Question(s) Posed In the Gas Inquiry
1. The terms of reference  required the Commission to consider
whether gas transmission  and/or gas distribution systems
should be controlled, i.e., assess
– Whether competition is limited or likely to be lessened
– Control is necessary or desirable in the interests of persons who
acquire or  supply the goods or services in the affected market or
markets.
2. The Minister also requested the Commission’s advice on ‘the
methodology that  the Commission considers appropriate for
valuation of pipeline assets’, ‘the net  benefits to the public of
control’ and ‘any other matter that the Commission  may think
relevant to a decision on whether control should be
introduced’.
Commerce Act Part 4 Inquiry
•“Is it necessary or desirable in the interests of acquirers, consumers or producers, for
control to be imposed?
• The overarching purpose of the Act the “long term benefit  of consumers” suggests that
dynamic rather than static approach is relevant, even for the “benefits to acquirers”
•The Commission’s interpretation: the transfer of ‘excess profits’ from producers to acquirers
is a benefit – under a public benefits test the transfer is welfare neutral and produces no
benefit (except where these are ‘functionless’ profits that flow to foreigners)
–  general approach to competition law has been the Public Benefits Test
– general approach to regulation has been to factor in Net Public Benefits to Acquirers
• The interpretation cannot be justified by assessment of incidence, by guidance of criteria
in the Act, and given the Commission’s calculation of excess profits it cannot be justified by
dynamic performance, or by mimicking a competitive market
• The Act is consistent with seeking to mimic a competitive market: ie allow rents to function
Background: Relevant Characteristics
of Gas Pipelines in NZ
• The demand for gas pipelines is derived from the demand (and supply) for gas:
anything that affects the supply/demand for gas affects the demand for pipelines
• Demand by households
– is very small in NZ relative to, gas used in industry, and situation in other countries
– Is subject to electricity competition
• There is no actual or implied statutory requirement to supply: i.e. to supply is a
commercial decision
• Pipeline businesses are: capital intensive, have sunk long lived capital, face
considerable uncertainty
• The NZ gas market is tiny by any yardstick, has great uncertainty about future
supplies, has no spot market in gas, and prospects for a thick spot market are
remote
The Approach: the Draft Decision
• Little weight was placed on interfuel competition and so advancement
to the next step of price control appraisal
• The benefits and cost of control were then considered by checking
out
– benefits to acquirers, and
– public net benefits test
• By
– estimating net benefits by comparing a “factual” of price control to
a counterfactual of no price control
Desirable Approach
1. The net benefit analysis should compare the factual (price control under the
Commission’s nomenclature) and the counterfactual
2. The costs and benefits of price control should be assessed looking forward
from the date of price control implementation 2005:
3. The (unadjusted) past cannot tell us about the factual vs counterfactual
because behaviour is different between the alternative regimes. “Excess”
profits should only be assessed in the context of the factual vs the
counterfactual
4. Assess risk and expected outcomes by using
i) historical information on variability in such factors as operating costs, demand and
customer numbers,
ii) anticipated structural changes in the economic environment,
iii) assumptions on behavioural effects of regulation - estimate the range of potential
outcomes
5. Calculate the range and likelihood of net benefits arising from price control.
The Draft Decision
• The price control used in the factual was different from that
proposed as policy by the Commission
• Focused heavily on static “excess” profits at the expense of
assessing the investment effects on net benefits
• Did not seriously incorporate risk (including regulatory) or
variability
• Made limited behavioural and regulatory cost adjustments
between the factual and counterfactual
• Made a certain mistakes in the implementation of the conceptual
approach advocated in calculating “excess” profits: e.g. treatment
of acquisitions.
Risk Not Treated
 Capacity Determined by Historical Maximum Throughput
Implies (partial) Costly Stranding Almost Surely
Gate capacity
Actual demand
Gate capacity
Actual demand
NGC Gate Station Gas Flows
Importance of the Right Regulatory Process I
Stranding is Normal for Most Networks
• The ODV/ODRC  regulatory scheme benchmark
• ODV/ORC
– is wise after the event
• looking backwards in time almost always less than actual capital is
“needed”, and
• “needed” capital can be very different from efficient capital.
– Some allowance for unused but potentially useable capital must be
made if a firm is to breakeven on participation in the regulatory
scheme
– typically understates capital unless an adjustment is made to the
rate of return
– Does not allow for (economies of scale in investment) investment
in advance
• Studies such as this (and other profit studies that say NPV
looking back should = 0) ignore the stranding issue and thus
understate capital/the rate of return required and thereby
overstate excess profits and ignore company responses
Importance of the Right Regulatory Process II
Competition with Electricity: Small Gas Consumers
• Background: ODV/ODRC  regulatory scheme, all houses have electricity
• The rate base to which the regulatory rate of return is applied is
ODV = min (ODRC, EV)
where EV = (present) value of the cost-saving in delivering energy
because the pipeline network is in place
and where the alternative need not actually be in place.
• This implies that if there is actual or (potential) cheaper cost in delivering energy
by an electricity network: the pipes will be excluded from the rate base
• Thus for a given spark gap a) where there is excess capacity in the electricity
network local pipes have no value, and b) where electricity network expansion
is cheaper, or occurs for other reasons, investment in pipes can be stranded
• Conclusion: investment in pipes to small demanders must be severely curtailed
and stranding enhanced by this form of regulation
Importance of the Right Regulatory Process III
Tax Calculation
• The conceptual approach of the draft was to set up pipeline businesses with
capital given by ODV and prices such that expected net present value of these
businesses was zero on a post tax basis
• In implementation, tax was based upon acquisition values of assets acquired,
not the regulatory ODV values
• This had the effect of setting lower prices than the Commission had
conceptually argued were appropriate for assessing excess profits
• The effect was to bias upwards the assessment of excess profits and thereby
the bias upwards the transfers attributed to regulation that were ultimately taken
as a benefit.
Tests Applied in the Draft I
• In implementing the public benefits test the rule was invoked
that
• transfers among NZ public did not produce net benefits: only
increases in the size of the pie were net benefits, but
• Transfers from (to) foreign owners were benefits (costs) and
reached the view that foreign-owned firms should be regulated
more tightly than domestically held firms
• On the basis of this outcome the Commission concluded that
the public benefits test was not appropriate and so chose as
its criterion benefits to acquirers
• There was no detailed analysis presented of the legal or
economic basis of the tests applied
Tests Applied in the Draft II
• Do not mimic a competitive market or sit easily
with the  the High Court (in the Amps A Decision).
• Do not place weight on the role of expected
profits for investment, efficiency gains and market
participation
• Would under the (draft) public benefit test
consistently imply foreign firm discrimination in
competition law and by extension contract law
Draft Conclusion
• Positive Acquirer’s Benefit from Control
NGC (transmission and distribution), Powerco, Wanganui Gas
and Vector
• Positive Net Public Benefit from Control
NGC transmission and distribution (because it was foreign
owned)
• Negative Net Public Benefit from Control
Vector, Powerco and Wanganui Gas 
The Commission considered that if companies under price control
reduced investment that other firms would fill the gap: implying
it acceptable for regulation to substantially lessen competition
Cost Benefit Analysis can take some Account
of Volatility, Risk and Investment
• Charles River Associates (CRA) developed a simple dynamic
model (based upon standard methodology) that
– enabled a forward-looking cost-benefit analysis from 2005
– incorporated risk (and so provided a range of outcomes and their
likelihood)
– permitted the correct regulatory factual to be analysed
– enabled investment effects to be incorporated explicitly
– Did not incorporate the stranding problem
•    CRA Applied the Model to NGC Distribution
–Assumed that the Commission’s (largest) WACC  (1% lower than NGC’s
publicly stated hurdle rate) would lower investment by 50%
–Found
•80% likelihood that Economic Profit would be negative
•98% likelihood that Net Acquirer’s Benefit would be negative (average -$2.1m)
•100% likelihood that Net Public Benefits would be negative (average -$3.7m)
The Final Report
• Retained
– A different regulatory factual from that posed as possible
– Did not consider risk in any detail: either that faced by the
companies or regulatory risk
– A very low WACC (outcome hugely affected by WACC)
– A low investment cost of regulation although changed from a one-
off 0.5% reduction in (2004) quantity to a 0.25% per annum
reduction
– Tax using acquisition values
•     Made a Number of Changes
–Changed its present value calculation
–No longer treated transfers from foreigners as a benefit to the public
•    Introduced
A measure:  the net public benefit lost per $ transferred
The Final Report Concluded
•  Positive Net Acquirer’s Benefit of regulating all pipeline providers
•  Negative Net Public Benefit of regulating all pipeline providers
•   The efficiency costs of regulating NGC and Wanganui Gas were too high
to warrant imposing control relative to the transfers that consumers
would get (>30c per $1 transferred)
•   The efficiency costs of regulating  Powerco and Vector were worth
     imposing control relative to the transfers that consumers would get
     (only 17 and 9c per $1 transferred respectively)
Bottom Line the Commission argued that a (thresholds) regulatory 
regime should be considered for all pipeline businesses. The 
thresholds regime is a significant step in regulation
Matters Arising
•   A net-benefit analysis of a regulatory scheme that mimics the
proposed regulatory scheme was not done
•   No evidence of incidence of transfers were provided and no
evidence of any social benefit in its benefits to acquirers test were
provided.
•   It was found that imposing price control, even on its assumptions of
negligible quality and investment effects, would reduce net public
benefits (e.g. reduce economic growth)
•   Price control was recommended
Process
•     A regulatory body was chosen to do the analysis
•     It posed price control as the null hypothesis
•     It went beyond (on its own analysis) mimicking a competitive
market creating stiff hurdles for the  alternative hypothesis
•     Dynamic economic performance (growth) received low
ranking in the analysis and recommendations
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Section 36, Commerce Act 1986
No person with a substantial degree of
market power may take advantage of that
power (in that or any other market) for the
purpose of  --
• Restricting entry
• Preventing or deterring competition
• Eliminating a competitor
Outline
1. The nature of rules (and what history
may tell us)
2.Five approaches to monopoly
• Counterfactual analysis
• The purpose exception
• Conduct which is materially facilitated by
market power
• Predatory pricing
• Business justification
The Nature of Rules (and what the
History of Antitrust may tell us)
General Rules
Grinnell Corp
Two elements to unlawful monopolisation under
section 2, Sherman Act:
1. Possession of monopoly power; and
2. Willful acquisition or maintenance of that power
as distinguished from growth or development of
a superior product, business acumen or historic
accident
Specific Rules
Two key examples
Predatory Pricing: Brooke Group
1. Prices below a relevant measure of cost of
production; and
2. Reasonable prospect (or dangerous probability) of
recoupment of investment in below cost prices.
Essential Facilities: MCI
1. Control by a monopolist of an essential facility;
2. Competitor is unable practically or reasonably to
duplicate the facility;
3. Unjustified denial of access to the facility; and
4. Grant of access is feasible
Five Possible Approaches in New
Zealand Setting
1.Counterfactual analysis
2. Purpose exception
3. Conduct materially facilitated by market 
power
4. Price predation
5. Business justification
Sources of Law
“Take advantage” and “use” elements did
not come into alignment until 2001
No real difference:
Queensland Wire
Melway
Cf: Commentary to the Commerce Bill 2001
Boral
NZ legal developments have followed Australian
precedent. In particular:
  Telecom/Clear - influence of Queensland Wire
  Carter Holt Harvey - influence of Boral
The Counterfactual Question
Has the monopolist acted in the same way
that it would have, had the market been
(hypothetically) competitive?
Approach to the Counterfactual
Discussion
1.Problems with counterfactuals
2.Three case studies
3.The would/could aside
Problems with Counterfactuals
Cogency
Port Nelson
Melway
Formulation
NT Power (FCAFC)
Cf other counterfactual assumptions
(sections 27 and 47)
Three Case Studies
1.Queensland Wire
2. Melway
3. NT Power
Queensland Wire
Queensland Wire
BHP
Y-bar
AWI QWI
Melway
Automotive
parts
Bookshop Service
stations
Office
stationery Wholesale
Automotive
parts
Bookshop Service
stations
Office
stationery
Retail
NT Power
PAWARetail
PAWADistribution
PAWATransmission
NT PowerPAWAGeneration
The Would/Could Aside
Would
Queensland Wire (Mason CJ and Wilson J)
Telecom/Clear
Melway
Carter Holt Harvey
NT Power
Safeway
Could
Queensland Wire (Dawson J)
Melway
Rural Press
“Would” = Prevalent NZ Position
Telecom/Clear and Carter Holt Harvey
Does the Difference Matter?
“Could” may be narrower
But a rational conduct inquiry is likely to
apply the same way under both approaches
The Purpose Exception
Foundation Case
Queensland Wire (Deane J)
Alternate Recognition
NT Power
Dangers with Purpose
Telecom/Clear
Melway
Boral
Carter Holt Harvey
Narrow Rule
Confined to circumstances where the competitor will be
totally deprived from competing?
Conduct Materially Facilitated by
Market Power
The conclusion in Queensland Wire that BHP’s
refusal to supply Y-bar was made possible by the
absence of competitive conditions:
“does not exclude the possibility that, in a
given case, it may be proper to conclude that a
firm is taking advantage of market power where
it does something that is materially facilitated
by the existence of the power, even though it
may not have been absolutely impossible
without the power.”
Subsequent Cases
Safeway
Rural Press
Problems and Application
Unclear formulation and uncertain open-
endedness
Consistency with application of
counterfactual analysis
Likely prevalence of counterfactual analysis
Predatory Pricing
Specific rule; general rule; or a mixture?
Boral
Carter Holt Harvey
Business Justification
Alternative Use of Justifications
1. Purpose (Queensland Wire and Melway)
2. Defence (Telecom/Clear and Melway (FCAFC))
3. Element of counterfactual (Carter Holt Harvey)
Defence application unlikely
Subset of counterfactual analysis means it is not a
stand-alone test
Concluding Position
In reality there are likely to be just three
(and not five) approaches to the
characterization question:
Material facilitation and business 
justification are unlikely to result in 
stand-alone formulations
Concluding Position cont
Three key propositions emerge
1.Counterfactual analysis will operate as
an all-purpose general rule
2. Purpose exception may emerge as a
stand-alone rule in exceptional cases -
but even then it is likely to be
subservient to the counterfactual rule
3. Price predation is the one specific rule
formulation to emerge (but it is coupled
with counterfactual analysis).
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Outline
• Goals  and criteria for assessment
• Institutional structures for regulatory
agencies
• Costs and benefits of the integrated
agency model
• Role of judicial review
• The practice of Regulatory conferences
• Summary of problems and solutions
• Conclusion.
The Goal
• Processes for assessing anti-trust and
regulatory issues that result in the
highest probability of decisions that
facilitate social welfare enhancement
and do not result in reductions in social
welfare.
• Combination of structure, process and
incentives
Normative Criteria
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Agency Models
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Integrated Agency Model
• A single agency undertakes investigative,
enforcement, and adjudicative functions.
• Examples:
• FTC in the US.
• Competition Directorate-General of the EU.
• Securities Commissions
• NZ Commerce Commission
Integrated Agency Model
• Claimed advantages
• Higher levels of expertise since agency
staff and commissioners work day-to-day
in all aspects of competition law (under
bifurcated agency model, adjudicators
may see few cases).
• With multi-member commissions, there
is more accountability, consistency, and
continuity of decision-making.
• Faster decisions at lower resource cost
Integrated Agency Model
• Disadvantages
• Procedural presumption for the case put
by the Agency, and thus lack of
independence in decision-making
• The power of the agency to determine
outcomes without the scrutiny of an
adversarial process
• Importance depends on the presence
or absence of a right of appeal.
Procedural Rules and Credibility
• Procedural requirements reflect the pursuit of
credibility.
• Credibility is critical if regulation is to be
welfare enhancing:
– In the absence of credible regulation, private
investors require higher rates of return, and will
favour investment in generic rather than specific
assets.
Requirements for regulatory
credibility
• Credibility is enhanced where
– Process provides for scrutiny of the views of all
interested parties, including a rigorous analysis of
the views of the Commission staff,
– The decision-makers are independent of the
parties, and
– The decision-makers are not easily influenced by
the legislators
Requirements for regulatory
credibility #2
• Credibility is also enhanced by strong
incentives for regulators to make quality
decisions
– Loss of professional integrity with poor decisions
(people with substantial reputational capital make
the best regulators)
– Impairment of future career prospects with poor
decisions, and
– Right of appeal on “merit” as well as on “law”
Regulatory Conferences
• Conferences are designed to provide a forum
for stakeholders to participate and to
increase the credibility of regulation.
• Regulated firms, entrants and interest groups
play two important roles:
– Provide regulator with information about the state
of the world
– Provide regulator with information about interest
groups’ preferences
Conferences: The theory
• Conferences are not adversarial – no cross
examination.
• Representatives of interested parties may be
heard at the conference.
• The conference discusses the draft
determination or issues paper of the Commission.
• Commissioners use the information from the
conference to inform their decision.
Consultation not Examination
• Conferences are consultation processes
that start with a presumption for the case
put by the Commission.
• The conferences discuss the submissions
of the parties but provide no direct
examination of the Draft Determination.
– The process is designed to find weaknesses in
(reasons to dismiss) the submissions, not to
provide a rigorous assessment of the Draft
Determination.
Problems with Consultation Process
• Information flow is one-way and neither
the Commissioners nor the parties can
ask questions of the authors of the
Draft Determination.
• The Commissioners are asked to
assess their own work.  Can they?
Decision Making
“It is too much to expect men of
ordinary character and competence to
be able to judge impartially in cases
that they are responsible for having
instituted in the first place.”
Judge Richard Posner
Decision Making
“It strains credibility to believe that
Commissioners, who have authorized
the prosecution of a case that may
cost the agency (and hence
taxpayers) substantial sums, will at
the end of the process conclude that
a mistake was made and that the
respondent committed no wrong.”
Terry Calvani, former FTC Commissioner
Absence of Cross-Examination
• Designed to reduce the time and expense
associated with conferences?
• In the absence of cross-examination is it
possible for the conference to
– Elicit all relevant information needed to make
the welfare-maximising decision? and
– Provide incentives to make the welfare-
maximising decision?
Example
• Boyle, Evans and Guthrie (2006) raise
questions about many aspects of the
work on which the Commission has
relied for recent decisions about the
cost of capital for firms in industries
subject to regulation.
– These concerns seem sufficient to
warrant consideration of an appeal
against Commission decisions, if there
were an appeal process.
Asymmetric Cross-Examination
• Conference proceedings are adversarial:
cross-examination is in fact allowed.
– Commission experts and staff undertake
extensive cross-examination of parties.
– Normally do so without reference to the
constraints that would apply to cross-
examination in a court.
• This asymmetry in rights of cross-
examination serves to limit the influence of
stakeholders.
– Consistent with consultation rather than
examination.
Independent Experts
• Commission views independent experts as
speaking on behalf of parties.
– No consideration of the qualifications of
individuals to act as an expert.
– Views experts as having less weight than non-
expert testimony provided by third parties.
• Consistent with a process designed to
consult stakeholders rather than a process
designed to maximise scrutiny of the draft
determination.
Judicial Review
• Legislation requires substantial interpretation
– Regulators have wide discretion
•  Legislative review will rarely be case-
specific, so legislative review is rare.
– Leaves regulators with wide discretion on
individual cases.
• Judicial review puts substantial limits on the
discretion available to the regulator in
individual cases (Spiller 1997).
Judicial Review
• In New Zealand: “merit” and “law” for the
Commerce Act (except electricity and price
control provisions) but not for decisions
under industry specific regulation:
– Appeals under the Telecommunications Act and
under Electricity Industry price controls are
provided only on matters of law.
• In the US: merit and law for decisions of all
administrative and regulatory agencies
(Spiller 1997).
Judicial Review
• Where the threat of judicial review is largely
absent, regulatory credibility requires that
much greater emphasis be placed on the
process, especially the quality of governance
and the transparency and independence of
decision processes.
• Judicial review improves credibility even
where the Commissioners are independent
– Tests the quality of the Commissioners’ analysis.
Judicial Review
• Governance = the design of institutions
that induce or force management to
internalize the welfare of stakeholders
(Tirole 2001)
– A right of appeal to the courts is an
effective means of providing governance
without costly multiple layers of regulators.
Summary of the Problems #1
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Summary of the Problems #2
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Normative Criteria Again
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Two Possible Solutions
• Bifurcated agency model
• Staff present and defend their report
• Commissioners write the decision
themselves.
• Appeal to the High Court on merit as
well as law.
Costs and Benefits
• Some resource cost associated with
these solutions.
– But what is the cost of making decisions
that are not optimal?
• Appeals are costly,
– But because they are costly and since
their primary role is to create incentives
they are rarely used (as practice in
Canada, Australia and EU demonstrates).
Conclusion
Overall, appeals to the High Court may be the
most cost effective solution:
• Avoids costly changes to current Commission
structure and aligns regulation with anti-trust
processes.
• Provides incentives that may remove the
need for appeal in most cases.
– Might also lead to changes in Commission
processes at regulatory hearings without making
these significantly more costly
• Reduces the chance of false positive
recommendations to regulate.
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